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RESPONSE

E-SPORTS AS A PRISM FOR THE ROLE OF EVOLVING
TECHNOLOGY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY *

JENNIFER E. R OTHMAN†
In response to Dan L. Burk, Owning e-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161 U. P A . L. R EV . 1535 (2013).
INTRODUCTION
In this Symposium on the Evolving Internet, I have been asked to provide
some reﬂections on Dan Burk’s thoughtful Article analyzing proprietary
rights in e-sports.1 E-sports, or professional video gaming, is already big
business in South Korea and is becoming increasingly popular in the United
States. Professional gaming competitions and their distribution present
myriad intellectual property (IP) questions, particularly about the “ownership and control of rights in player performances,”2 given that the competitions are publicly performed and often broadcast and streamed online.
Professor Burk suggests ways current IP law might analyze some of the

© Jennifer E. Rothman, 2013.
† Professor of Law and Joseph Scott Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, California. I thank Christopher Yoo and the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review for organizing this conference and for asking me to contribute this commentary. This essay
is adapted from a talk given at the University of Pennsylvania on October 20, 2012, as part of the
Law Review’s Symposium, The Evolving Internet.
1 Dan L. Burk, Owning e-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 1535 (2013).
2 Id. at 1536.
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complex questions raised by e-sports.3 In this Response, I focus on what esports reveals about how IP law should engage with new industries, technologies, and media of expression.
New industries and new technologies often inﬂuence the development
of IP law. Copyright law, in particular, has always evolved in the face of new
technology, such as the printing press and player piano rolls; however, until
recently, copyright’s evolution has been slow and the changes to the law
ostensibly technologically neutral. Over the last twenty years, however,
Congress has shifted gears and repeatedly passed technology-speciﬁc
legislation to address new inventions and industries.4 As a result, copyright
law has become unwieldy, overly complex, and incoherent to lay people and
experts alike.5 Worse still, the law has become ossiﬁed in the face of rapidly
changing technology that calls for nimbleness and ﬂexibility.
New York Times technology columnist David Pogue has likened keeping
up with the pace of new technological developments to “drinking out of a
ﬁre hose.”6 Computers and phones become obsolete almost as soon as they
are purchased, and the next big thing could transform markets and industries overnight (as iTunes and the iPhone have). The rapidity of such
changes, especially in the context of computer technology and Internet
applications, presents many challenges for the law, and for potential legislation in particular. In the context of e-sports and video games, there have
already been calls to pass legislation addressing some of the ownership
conﬂicts that have arisen or that are anticipated.7
In this Response to Owning e-Sports, I consider the ways in which IP law
can address the IP questions raised by changing technology and emerging
industries. IP laws cannot shift with every new invention or business. If
Congress relies on industry-speciﬁc legislation, trying to intervene in each
emerging or anticipated problem wrought by new technology, then our IP
system will fail us. Instead, the common law and broader principles of IP law
are tools better designed to address these novel IP questions.
3 See id. at 1544-77 (analyzing e-sports through the lens of copyright and alternative legal
regimes, such as the right of publicity and “neighboring rights”).
4 See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
5 See David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1331 (2004)
(describing the current state of copyright law as a “hopeless mishmash”).
6 David Pogue, Tech. Columnist, N.Y. TIMES, Keynote Address at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium: The Evolving Internet, at 47:21 (Oct. 20, 2012), available at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/newsroom/its_player.cfm?path=/pennlaw/temp/Evolving/Law_Revi
ew_Evolving_Keynote.mov.
7 See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa, Who Owns an Avatar? Copyright, Creativity, and Virtual Worlds, 14
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 959, 991 (2012) (advocating new amendments to the Copyright Act to
address ownership issues for video game players and providers).
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E-sports presents a useful case study of alternative ways of thinking about
technological changes and challenges to the IP system. My analysis focuses on
two primary insights. First, by revealing the inadequacy of the initial
analytical or doctrinal move made by courts, new industries and technologies
can illuminate missteps taken in IP common law. I consider two examples in
the context of e-sports: the use of “persona” in right of publicity law, and the
“initial interest confusion” doctrine in trademark law.
Second, a new context can highlight open and unanswered questions in
IP law that need to be addressed, sometimes by legislation, but more often
by applying existing law and focusing on the basic principles that underlie
the relevant area of law. I consider the example of how copyright law
addresses increasingly public uses of copyrighted content.
I. P EERING O VER THE PRECIPICE
New contexts sometimes reveal the need to recalibrate or overthrow a
ﬂawed doctrine. I focus on two examples of this eﬀect, both of which are
raised in the context of e-sports: first, the use of persona in right of publicity
law; and second, the initial interest confusion doctrine in trademark law.
Both doctrines have expanded in recent years, and I have criticized them
both elsewhere, at some length.8 Considering both examples in the context
of e-sports provides further proof of the bankruptcy of these doctrines and
the ways in which new technology pushes them to their logical extreme,
thereby revealing their fundamental ﬂaws.
A. Persona and the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity provides a cause of action when a person or entity
uses another’s identity without permission.9 Although Professor Burk
suggests that the right of publicity usually requires a physical manifestation
of the person,10 in recent years, the right of publicity has swept more
8 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 122 (2005) [hereinafter Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion]
(“The bulk of my criticism of initial interest confusion is directed at the use of the term when
there is no ﬁnding of likely confusion, but instead only a ﬁnding of initial interest.”); Jennifer E.
Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 206 (2002)
[hereinafter Rothman, Copyright Preemption] (“The application of persona to right of publicity
actions allows publicity holders to take property rights in an idea—in contravention of the
principles behind copyright law [and] severely constrain[ing] the creative ability of authors, the
public, and copyright holders who wish to create both original and derivative works.”).
9 Rothman, Copyright Preemption, supra note 8, at 202.
10 See Burk, supra note 1, at 1569-70 (“[A]pplicability of [publicity] rights is often clearest
when the personal trait at issue relies on material, usually bodily, portrayal.”).
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broadly. Initially, liability was limited to uses of a person’s name, likeness, or
image; however, the scope of the right has expanded (at least in common
law jurisdictions) to include the concept of “persona.”11 Persona encompasses anything that evokes the person of an “identity-holder” (the person
upon whom the right of publicity is based).12 The breadth of the concept
leads to liability even when an identity-holder’s identity has not, in fact,
been used; instead, a defendant can be held accountable for causing a mere
mental association with the identity-holder.13 Such an expansion of the
scope of the right of publicity raises serious First Amendment concerns,
often conﬂicts with copyright holders’ rights, and expands the right beyond
the heartland personality and economic interests that justify protecting the
right of publicity in the ﬁrst place.14
The case most prominently associated with the concept of persona is
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., decided in 1992 by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.15 White involved a Samsung advertisement for its
videocassette recorders (VCRs) that promoted the products’ longevity.16 To
bring this point home, the commercial featured a robot wearing a dress and
a blond wig, turning letters on the Wheel of Fortune set (or at least a recognizable replica of the show’s set).17 On-screen with the robot was a caption
reading, “Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D.”18 Neither White’s name,
nor likeness, nor voice was used in the commercial; therefore, no viewer was
likely to think that she had appeared in the commercial. Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit held that because the Samsung robot evoked White’s identity,
her right of publicity claim was suﬃcient to overcome Samsung’s summary
judgment motion and proceed to trial.19

11
12

Rothman, Copyright Preemption, supra note 8, at 204-05.
Id. at 205. I have coined the term “identity-holder” to distinguish the person upon whom the
right of publicity is based from the “publicity-holder,” who is the person who owns the right. If the
right of publicity is transferable, these two people need not be the same. See Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 187, 234-37 (2012) (providing an in-depth discussion of
this terminology and contending that the right of publicity should not be transferable inter vivos).
13 Rothman, Copyright Preemption, supra note 8, at 205.
14 Id. at 205-06, 222-25, 252-53, 257-58.
15 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
16 Id. at 1396.
17 Id. Wheel of Fortune is the television game show in which Vanna White turns letters on a
game board to help contestants solve word puzzles.
18 Id. The year 2012 has now come and gone, but when the commercial was made it seemed
far oﬀ, in a future ﬁlled with spaceships and robots.
19 Id. at 1397-99.
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Judge Alarcon dissented in part from the decision.20 Regarding the right of
publicity, he concluded that it was “patently clear to anyone viewing the
commercial advertisement that Vanna White was not being depicted. No
reasonable juror could confuse a metal robot with Vanna White.”21 Alarcon
criticized the majority for allowing White’s right of publicity claim to go to
a jury solely on the basis that viewers would make an association between
the Samsung robot and White (and, in particular, the role that she plays on
Wheel of Fortune).22 Judge Kozinski similarly criticized the decision in his
dissent from the denial of Samsung’s petition to rehear the case en banc.23
He objected to the possibility of liability for merely “evok[ing] the celebrity’s
image in the public’s mind.”24 Kozinski warned that this “Orwellian” notion
of persona would give “every famous person . . . an exclusive right to
anything that reminds the viewer of her.”25
Judge Kozinski’s fears have proven well founded as subsequent cases
have built upon White’s expansive interpretation of publicity rights.26 In
Wendt v. Host International, Inc., for example, the Ninth Circuit permitted a
right of publicity case to go forward against the operators of airport bars
designed to remind customers of the set from the hit television series
Cheers.27 Each bar featured two animatronic robots that were dressed
similarly to the characters of Norm and Cliﬀ from the series.28 George
Wendt and John Ratzenberger, the actors who portrayed those characters on
the show, sued, claiming that their likenesses and identities had been used
without their permission.29 The District Court for the Central District of
California concluded that the robots did not look like the actors and that no
20 White sued Samsung under three theories: the right to privacy, the right of publicity, and
the Lanham Act. Id. at 1402 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Alarcon
concurred in the majority’s denial of White’s right to privacy claim, but dissented from the
majority’s holding that White’s right to publicity and Lanham Act claims could go to the jury. Id.
21 Id. at 1404.
22 Id. at 1405.
23 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1514-15.
26 See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the “common-law right of publicity protects more than the knowing use of a plaintiﬀ ’s name or likeness . . .
. It also protects against appropriations of the plaintiﬀ ’s identity by other means” (citing White,
971 F.2d at 1398)).
27 Id. at 808-09.
28 Responding Brief of Defendant and Appellee Host International, Inc. at 1, Wendt, 125 F.3d
806 (No. 96-55243). The defendant, Host International, had licensed the use of the characters and
the Cheers set and name from Paramount Pictures, the producer and copyright holder of the show
and its characters. Id.
29 Wendt, 125 F.3d at 809.
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reasonable jury could find otherwise.30 The Ninth Circuit reversed this grant
of summary judgment and decided, without elaboration, that the case should
proceed to trial because there were “material facts . . . that might cause a
reasonable jury to find [the robots] suﬃciently ‘like’ the appellants.”31
Judge Kozinski dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc in Wendt,
bemoaning “[r]obots again.”32 He described the panel’s conclusion as a “curt
assertion,” oﬀered with “little explanation,” and one that was unjustified in
light of the usual deference to district courts on findings of fact.33 More
importantly in the context of this discussion, Kozinski concluded that the
panel’s analysis could only make sense under a broad understanding of likeness
and identity.34 He interpreted the panel’s decision as allowing liability for the
mere evocation of the actors in the minds of the bar’s customers: “[T]he panel
allows the plaintiﬀs to pick up where Vanna left oﬀ: . . . anyone who wants to
use a figure, statue, robot, drawing or poster that reminds the public of Wendt
and Ratzenberger must first obtain (and pay for) their consent.”35
Reading White and Wendt together demonstrates that a right of publicity
claim may arise not only when the names, signatures, voices, and likenesses
of plaintiﬀs are used, but also when the use of a character simply brings to
mind an actor who played such a character. Such an eﬀect is likely to occur
frequently with respect to characters from television shows or movies.36
Much as White was able to recover more than $400,000 from a jury for a
“robot [that] looked nothing like her,”37 Wendt left open the door for Wendt
and Ratzenberger to recover even if the robots were found not to look like
them. Unsurprisingly, rather than take their chances with a jury, Host and
Paramount settled out of court with the two actors.38
30 Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., No. 93-0142-R, 1996 WL 34448499, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19,
1996), rev’d, 125 F.3d 806; see also Wendt, 125 F.3d at 809-10 (noting that the district court could not
ﬁnd “any similarity at all” between the robots and the actors).
31 Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810.
32 Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
33 Id.
34 See id. at 1285-87 (attributing the Ninth Circuit’s holding to the “unbounded right of publicity announced in White”).
35 Id. at 1286 (emphasis added).
36 See id. at 1286-87 (arguing, as an illustration of the implications of Wendt, that the copyright holders of the television series Seinfeld could be prevented from recasting the character of
Newman in a spin-oﬀ series); see also Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811 (citing with approval Motschenbacher
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974), in which the court held that the
use of an image of a race car similar to one driven by the plaintiﬀ could give rise to a right of
publicity claim even though neither the plaintiﬀ ’s name, nor likeness, nor image were used);
Rothman, Copyright Preemption, supra note 8, at 210-14, 222-25, 252-54, 257-62.
37 Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1287.
38 Norm and Cliﬀ Cheered by Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2001, at C2.
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In the context of e-sports, the doctrine of persona is taken to its logical extreme in a way that demonstrates the concept’s hollowness. With new technologies, what constitutes a “persona” is virtually limitless. In her study of e-sports,
sociologist T.L. Taylor suggests that e-sports players have specific, recognizable
styles of play.39 Burk raises the possibility that the right of publicity—or a
similar right—might protect these distinctive styles and prevent others from
adopting similar styles.40 This prospect is not far-fetched, given that persona
has been used to protect a singer’s vocal style, even though neither his voice nor
his music were used in an advertisement for tortilla chips.41
Protecting a unique playing style under right of publicity law would severely constrain other players who might wish to adopt a similar style (perhaps because they want to pay homage to a successful pro or because the style
itself might make them more likely to succeed at the game) or who organically have a similar style of play. Such an extension of the right of publicity
highlights the thin ice on which the doctrine of persona sits. The mere
evocation of style or the spurring of mental associations should not establish a
use deserving of liability.
Similar to e-sports’ illumination of the pitfalls of using persona to establish a violation of the right of publicity, new technologies—especially the
Internet—have also exacerbated, extended, and highlighted the ﬂawed
trademark law doctrine of initial interest confusion.
B. Initial Interest Confusion and the Overextension of Trademark Law
The touchstone of trademark infringement is a showing that consumers
are likely to be confused as to source, sponsorship, or aﬃliation when a
defendant uses another’s mark (or something similar) on its own products
or services, or in its advertising.42 Over time, however, some courts have
created a doctrine called “initial interest confusion,” in which they have
found trademark infringement—even in the absence of likely consumer
confusion—on the basis that a consumer might be initially “interested,”
“attracted,” or “distracted” by a defendant’s products or services because of

39 T.L. TAYLOR, RAISING THE STAKES: E-SPORTS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF
COMPUTER GAMING 109-10 (2012).
40 See Burk, supra note 1, at 1572 (suggesting, albeit somewhat skeptically, that there may be
elements of an e-sports professional’s game performance that are “suﬃciently distinctive” to
warrant individualized proprietary consideration).
41 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096-�� (�th Cir. ����) (aﬃrming a verdict
against Frito-Lay for its radio commercial, which featured a vocal performance “imitating [singer
Tom] Waits’ raspy singing voice”).
42 Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion, supra note 8, at 107.
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an association with a plaintiﬀ ’s mark, products, or services.43 This illconceived doctrine spread like wildﬁre in the early days of the Internet as
jurists unfamiliar with the new technology thought that confusion was likely
to run rampant on the Internet.44 Courts described clicking on another’s
website out of curiosity or actual interest as akin to being hijacked; their
concern was that consumers would somehow ﬁnd themselves unable to
navigate back to a trademark holder’s oﬃcial site.45
As the Internet has grown, some courts have backed away from this misguided attempt to extend liability. Now that judges and consumers have
become more familiar with the Internet, and the Internet’s speed and
reliability have vastly improved, the notion that the new technology of the
Internet justiﬁes extending liability to mere association has been soundly
refuted.46 The mere diversion of consumers by oﬀering alternative choices
or referring to trademarked products is not an appropriate subject for
regulation when the consumers know where they are going and what they
are buying. Although a trademark holder might lose some business to
competitors in these instances, it is appropriate to permit such fair and free
competition. The presentation of options and alternatives promotes consumer choice and low-cost, high-quality goods and services. Competitors
should be able to divert, attract, or interest consumers as long as they do not
mislead them as to sponsorship, source, or aﬃliation.
In the context of e-sports, Burk notes that video game companies have
tried to control uses of and associations with their games under a variety of
theories—most notably, copyright law.47 Many e-sports competitors and
competitions would no doubt appreciate funding and sponsorship from the
relevant video game companies, but the absence of such sponsorship should
43 Id. at 108 (emphasis omitted). This doctrine originally emerged from an appropriate starting
point: after Congress amended the Lanham Act in 1962, thereby eliminating the requirement that
“purchasers” be deceived, courts expanded trademark infringement doctrine to take into consideration the likelihood of confusion prior to the time of sale. Id. at 160-61. In adopting the initial
interest confusion doctrine, however, some courts have ignored the Lanham Act’s requirement that
there be a likelihood of confusion by holding that the mere diversion of business away from a
trademark holder constitutes trademark infringement. Id. at 122 & n.57.
44 See id. at 109-10, 117-21, 168-76.
45 See id. at 117-21, 168-76 (highlighting the shortcomings of various decisions, including
Brookﬁeld Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., ��� F.�d ���� (�th Cir. ����), that radically
“overestimate[d] the diﬃculty in returning to the Internet Highway”).
46 Cf. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 2010) (observing
that the sophistication of Internet users weighs against likely confusion when a defendant
incorporates another’s trademark into its URL).
47 See Burk, supra note 1, at 1544-69; see also TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 167-69 (describing
video game developer Blizzard’s far-reaching claim that its right to manage its video games
extends far beyond broadcast licensing).
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not result in legal liability. Lawful purchasers of the games should be able to
advertise the nature of the competition at hand without risking liability for
mere association with, or initial diversion from, a video game company’s
product, absent a false or misleading suggestion of endorsement. The ability
to use trademarked products in public should be sacrosanct—not only
because mere association should not be actionable, but also because such
uses should be protected under either statutory or nominative fair use
defenses. Statutory fair use (sometimes also referred to as “descriptive fair
use”) provides a defense when a defendant uses the plaintiﬀ ’s trademark to
accurately describe the features of its own product or service.48 Nominative
fair use provides a defense when a defendant uses the plaintiﬀ ’s trademark
to describe the plaintiﬀ ’s product, rather than its own.49 In the e-sports
context, the competitions and players describe the game they are actually
playing, which happens to be trademarked. This should meet the requirements of either statutory fair use (in jurisdictions where the concept
embraces references to another’s trademark rather than only to underlying
qualities) or nominative fair use, so long as nothing is done to expressly
indicate oﬃcial sponsorship.
The examination of the troublesome concepts of persona and initial interest
confusion suggests that new technologies, such as the Internet, may magnify
and illuminate ill-conceived doctrines in IP by taking them to extremes, or in
unexpected directions. As I discuss next, the Internet and e-sports have also
revealed undeveloped aspects of IP law that are profoundly important to
achieving a better balance between rights of copyright owners and users.
II. ILLUMINATION: T HE BREAKDOWN OF THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE
D IVIDE IN C OPYRIGHT LAW
The Internet has exploded our concept of what is public and what is private. E-sports provides a good example of this phenomenon. While people
48 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006) (noting that a party’s use of another’s trademark does not
constitute infringement if the mark “is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe
the goods and services of such party”); see also Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion, supra note 8, at 176-77.
49 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). The
nominative fair use defense applies if the following requirements are met:

“First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identiﬁable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as
is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must
do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”
Id. at 308; see also Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion, supra note 8, at 177-78.
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once played board games and video games in the privacy of their own homes,
usually either by themselves or with only a few friends, now video games are
played over the Internet with many parties, or in public competitions amid
fans and broadcast media. What was once private, solo, and oﬀ-the-radar is
now very public, communal, and trackable. This shift raises important
questions for IP law, especially copyright law. As Burk emphasizes, e-sports
involves “user participation, interactivity, and collaboration[, all of which] are
common to information and communication technology, [but] with which
copyright seems particularly unequipped to deal.”50
Copyright law has long created conﬂicts between the interests of copyright holders and those of the broader public who wish to access, consume,
use, comment on, and build upon copyrighted works. Many of these
potential conﬂicts were, until recently, swept under the rug. In a world in
which many uses of copyrighted works were private and untraceable, some
potentially infringing uses went largely unnoticed. Some scholars, notably
Jessica Litman, have concluded that because of the historical lack of enforcement against such “personal” copying, these uses sit outside of copyright law.51 I have questioned the conclusion that nonenforcement carves out
exceptions to copyright law, but more importantly, I have also contended that
what is “personal” should not turn on whether a particular use is made in
private or in public.52 Uses that are personal in nature may take place in
public and their legitimacy should therefore be evaluated along other vectors.
In the case of e-sports, many of the potential infringements of copyright
take place in the context of individuals engaging in uses of video games that
they have been given access to and encouraged to play—in fact, most of the
potentially infringing acts involve playing those games in public for both
pleasure and competition. As I have noted in my work on custom and the
common law in the context of IP, community-building leisure activities and
sports competitions were among the traditional bases for permitting public

50
51

Burk, supra note 1, at 1537.
See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1878-94, 1908, 1911-20 (2007)
(arguing that a broad conceptualization of lawful personal use strikes the appropriate “equilibrium
between copyright owners’ rights to exploit works and individuals’ liberties to enjoy them,” but
favoring noncommercial and private uses for this personal-use privilege); see also L. RAY PATTERSON
& STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 193-96 (1991)
(relying on historically unenforced zones of personal use to argue that there should be no infringement
of copyright when an individual uses a copyrighted work for his own “personal” or “private” use).
52 Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 463, 471-74 (2010).
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use of real property owned by others.53 Such activities were deemed to
merit an exception to private property laws on the ground that they facilitated the ability of communities to come together.54 E-sports is about such
communal uses of video games.55 Taylor’s study reveals that one of the
central features of e-sports is a desire to connect to others.56 In the context
of IP, such communal activities and competitions should be in the heartland
of uses that are given extra latitude and protection.
I do not intend to draw individual conclusions about possible uses of
copyrighted video games and whether they would be infringing or fair.
Instead, my focus is on the larger point that the Internet has changed the
way we use copyrighted works. Uses of copyrighted works are now more
easily trackable, blockable, and removable than ever before. This new reality
requires copyright law to confront whether fair use is an aﬃrmative right or
merely a defense. Technology could spell the end of fair use, not only
because of its ability to track uses, but also because of its ability to limit
access to and uses of copyrighted works.57 We will need to decide if, and
how, the law should intervene to constrain this potential of the evolving
Internet.58 We need to think deeply about the values that we wish to
promote with fair use and what it means to give some use rights to the
public—not just when such uses cannot be detected, but also when they are
front and center. New legislation may be required in the long run, but ﬁrst
we should see if the guiding principles of copyright law can direct us toward
an equitable balance between protecting copyright holders and providing
room for continued fair use.

53 Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright, Custom and Lessons from the Common Law (manuscript at
2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2183317, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2013).
54 Id.; Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 758-59, 766-71, 779-81 (1986).
55 See Burk, supra note 1, at 1540-41 (describing the communal nature of e-sports).
56 See TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 86-89 (“From the earliest days of PC gaming this desire to
connect to others and play head-to-head or cooperatively has been present. The old work-around
of dragging machines to each others’ houses has been signiﬁcantly supplanted via online networked capability. The multiplayer aspect of e-sports is central.”).
57 Undoubtedly, some sophisticated parties will be able to circumvent many of these technological eﬀorts, but the general public may face signiﬁcant hurdles in doing so.
58 Another signiﬁcant challenge in the Internet era is created by licensing regimes that limit
fair use and ownership of copyrighted works via contract (e.g., clickwrap licenses). See Viva R.
Moﬀat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 45, 87-108 (2007) (arguing for preemption of the enforcement of adhesion contracts
that place limitations on copyright’s fair use doctrine); Ochoa, supra note 7, at 964-66 (discussing
the impact of end-user license agreements on copyright ownership of avatars).
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C ONCLUSION
E-sports provides a prime example of how new industries and new technologies can reveal new facets of IP law, as well as ﬂaws in its current
articulation. Many of the doctrinal challenges for IP law that Burk raises in
his Article reveal where, and how, the law has overextended itself—for
example, in relying on persona or initial interest confusion to ﬁnd liability.
E-sports also highlights the Internet’s shift from a private world of engagement with IP to a public one. This shift requires a back-to-basics approach,
in which new technology should be seen as facilitating the development of
IP law rather than requiring new, industry-speciﬁc legislation.
New technologies and industries provide both opportunities and challenges. IP law should not rush into the breach when such challenges arise.
Instead, new technologies provide an occasion for thinking deeply about
broader guiding principles that are not wedded to any particular technology.
If we become overly focused on speciﬁc technologies and speciﬁc industries,
we will ﬁnd ourselves reproducing the failings of recent amendments to the
Copyright Act, such as the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA).59
When it was passed, the AHRA sought to address an emerging, but nowdefunct, digital audio technology known as “DAT” (Digital Audio Tape).
Even if such laws are not immediately outdated, they can quickly lock in
regimes that could—and should—have evolved diﬀerently. Consider the
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA),60
passed as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).61
OCILLA sought to immunize internet service providers (ISPs) from
copyright liability for the posting of infringing materials by third parties.62
One of the main purposes of the legislation was to temper the Wild West
atmosphere of the Internet by encouraging self-monitoring—behavior that,
without the immunity provided by OCILLA, could have placed ISPs at risk
59 Pub. L. No. 102-���, ��� Stat. ���� (����) (codiﬁed as amended at �� U.S.C. §§ ����–1010
(2006)). At the time it was passed, David Nimmer called this legislation the “worst thing that had
ever happened to the Copyright Act.” Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1331. The AHRA was applied so
narrowly to the speciﬁc DAT technology for which it was passed that it was held not to cover
other digital recording devices, such as MP3 players, which turned out to be a much more
successful technology. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180
F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Rio, an MP3 player, is not a digital audio
recording device subject to the restrictions of the AHRA).
60 Pub. L. No. 105-���, ��� Stat. ���� (����) (codiﬁed at �� U.S.C. § ��� (����)).
61 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
62 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (exempting service providers from liability for copyright infringement for,
inter alia, transmission of material or system caching, if the material is submitted by a third party;
and storing information or referring or linking users to infringing material, if the service provider
is not on notice of the infringing material).
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of liability under the common law for the postings of third parties.63 The law
was enacted in an era when it was extremely diﬀicult, if not impossible, to
monitor sites for infringing material. Now, sophisticated fingerprinting
technology has made identifying and removing infringing material not only
possible, but fairly easy for ISPs.64 Why, then, should ISPs continue to get a
free ride? Moreover, OCILLA created problems where none existed before.
In its eﬀort to provide some limited speech protections through a take-down
and put-back process, it created a system that in practice has largely been
speech-limiting.65 Such unintended consequences are diﬃcult to undo and the
law more generally has become antiquated in the face of new technology.
As new challenges arise in e-sports and in the context of other emerging
technology-based industries, legislatures should take serious pause before
adopting new laws. Courts should take the lead in this arena and should
consider how longstanding, undergirding principles shed light on a path
forward. There will be instances in which new legislation is required, but it
should be the path of last resort. When necessary, legislation should be
undertaken only once some degree of technological stabilization has been
reached; the statutes must then be written, as much as possible, with broad
principles—rather than industry-speciﬁc considerations—in mind.
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the course of their activities”); cf. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing one of the goals of 47 U.S.C. § 230, a provision analogous to OCILLA, as “encourag[ing]
interactive computer services and users of such services to self-police the Internet for obscenity
and other oﬀensive material”).
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HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 681-92 (2006) (discussing the results of a study of OCILLA notices that
reveals that the law has been used to take down material in “numerous questionable situations”).

